Abstract-As
INTRODUCTION
In discrete alternative multicriteria decision problems, the primary concern for the decision aid is the following:
(1) choosing the most preferred alternative to the decision maker (DM), (2) ranking alternatives in order of importance for selection problems, or (3) screening alternatives for the final decision.
The general concepts of domination structures and nondominated solutions play an important role in describing the decision problems and the decision maker's revealed preferences described above (see [l] ). So far, various approaches have been developed as the decision aid (see, for example, [2] ). Within the category (l), interactive methods based on the preference cones have been proposed to effectively get the most preferred solution (see, for instance, [3-51). In these approaches, under the assumption of an implicit quasi-concave increasing value function, preference cones are constructed by pairwise comparisons among alternatives at each iteration. Then, the set of alternatives is gradually reduced to a smaller one by identifying and eliminating inferior alternatives from the set of alternatives by preference cones and finally end up with the most preferred alternative. On the other hand, it, is not uncommon that the DM is only willing or able to provide incomplete information, due to time pressure, lack of knowledge, fear of commitment, etc. Thus, from the 0898-1221/00/$ -see front matter @ 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Typ-et by 4&W PII: SO898-1221(00)00088-,2 necessity of considering incomplete information, Weber [6] presented a general framework for decision making with incomplete information.
Kirkwood and Sarin [7] derived conditions to determine whether a pair of alternatives can be ranked and presented a procedure for ranking alternatives using an additive value function with the incomplete information on the weights. Kmietowicz and Pearman [8] dealt with decision problems under conditions of linear partial information (LPI) on probabilities of occurrence for the states of nature and derived conditions ensuring strict and weak statistical dominance of one strategy over another. Pearman [9] proposed an ordered metric method for establishing the dominance of alternatives using the linear additive weighting rule in multiattribute decision making under the LPI on the weights. Park and Kim [lo] proposed a hierarchical dominance graph (HDG) by using pair-wise dominance relations in the multiattribute decision making with the decision maker's incomplete information on both weights and utilities under the assumption of the additive value function. The HDG can be used to aid in selecting one or more preferred alternatives.
The purpose of this paper is to propose a multilevel graph which visualizes an incomplete ranking of alternatives, to the extent that this is possible when incomplete information on the weights is available under the assumption of the additive value function. To construct it, the nested decomposition of the set of alternatives is established by sequentially locating alternatives, each of which is a top ranking for some weight, and then deleting them from the set of alternatives and locating alternatives, each of which is a top ranking for some weight among the remaining set, and so on. At the same time, the reference set on an immediate higher level of the alternative being evaluated is located since, for any weight, at least one alternative in the reference set. is a higher ranking than it. These can be done along the lines of data envelopment analysis (see, for instance, [11, 12] ). A ccording to the reference set, a multilevel graph is constructed.
In the following section, we first show how to decompose the set of alternatives and construct a multilevel graph by the DEA formulation.
It is shown that alternatives on the pth level of the graph based on the nested decomposition have at best pth ranking. Then, using a numerical example, we compare it with the HDG based on dominance relations proposed by Park and Kim [lo] . Concluding remarks are given in the final section.
MULTILEVEL GRAPHS BASED ON THE NESTED DECOMPOSITION
Let us consider n alternatives ai, i = 1,2,. . . ,7~ And let A = {ai}.
Suppose that each alternative ai has a multiattribute outcome denoted by a vector xi = (xlir ZZir.
where xji is the measurement on attribute j, j = 1,2,. . . , m. We assume that the attributes are additively independent. Thus, the value function I is written by a weighted additive value function where wj > 0 is a relative weight of attribute j (it is not necessary to sum up to unity) and vj is a single-attribute value function satisfying 0 2 Wj (Xji) 2 1, j = 1,2 ,...,m.
This paper is concerned with multicriteria decision problems with incomplete information on the weights, when Vj is given. In what follows, ai and vi are used interchangeably whenever no confusion arises. (a) the DMs respond to some preliminary questions for any pairs of alternatives, say al and a2, (1) if the DM prefers al to a2, then one can deduce from this wal > wa2 and bi') = al -a2, (2) if al is at least as good as a2, this is interpreted as wai >= was and bj (2) = al -a2 (3) if al is indifferent to as, then construct an equality of the form wai = waz and by) = al -a2, and/or (b) the information on the criteria, for instance, the order of importance, wi 2 w2 2 . . . 2 20,.
In what follows, let W = n Wli), for all nonempty sets Wi), i = 0, 1,2,3.
To rank alternatives:, to the extent that this is possible, according to W consider the following linear programming pr'oblem. W where E is a positive non-Archimedean infinitesimal which is used to replace > with 2 as is used in DEA, e, = (1, 1, . . . , l)T is an m-dimensional vector, Bci), i = 1,2,3, is an m x tci) matrix whose column vectors are b(j) .
3 ) J = 1,2 )...) t(i). REMARK 2.
(i) Note that the 'last three constraints in (Pk) correspond to Wci), i = 1,2,3, respectively, and therefore, whenever Wci) = 0, i = 1,2,3, th e corresponding constraint is removed from the constraints. (ii) In the formulation of (Pk), observe that we can assume vj = WTvj 2 c, j = 1,2,. . . ,n, for any c > 0, instead of Vj = WTvj 2 1, j = 1,2,. . . , n, since w is not normalized to one. Let us now consider the dual problem of (Pk): for all ai E Ez C c,.
Note that 2; < 1 implies either 6) en,, T A* < 1, or (ii) eLfijA* = 1.
In the case of (i), since WTvk > 0, it follows from (a) that (4 wTvk > c XfwTVk 2 c X,*wTv, = wTxpX*.
On the other hand, WTVk = wTxp~* _ wTp* _ ,T~(l)~(1)* _ wQ3P)p(2)* _ wTg(3)cL(3)*.
Since w E W, it follows that w > 0, wTB(l) > 0, wTB(') 2 0, and wTBc3) = 0. Therefore, we obtain wTVk 5 wTxpii*, which is a contradiction. In the case of (ii), it follows from (a) that wTvk = c Xfw'vk 2 c Xl WTVi = wTXpY .
Note that either 
I
(i) From Theorem 1, we can see that any ak in C, has, at best, a pth ranking, that is, a ranking of p or less. (ii) The reference set E:(c C,) is not necessarily unique. One can, however, say that al, E c P+i is dominated by Ei. (iii) We can conclude that, if only one alternative in Ekp of ak E C,+i exists, that is, only one arc (ai, ak) from CP to ak E CP+i exists in the multilevel graph, then ak is dominated by ai.
Observe that if ai dominates ak, then ak is at a lower level than ai. To show this, let ak be in C,. Note that ak is in X,. Now, let us suppose that ai is also in X,. The dual of problem (Dk)p is maximize vk = wTvk, subject to WTvi 2 1, fori=1,2 ,..., nP, (Wp w E w.
Since ai dominates ak, Vi = WTVi > vk = wTvk, for all 5 w E W, which yields maximize 'uk = wTvk < 1.
Therefore, ak cannot belong to C,, which is a contradiction. Thus, we have the following theorem. THEOREM 2. If + dominates ak, then ak is at a lower level than Q in the multilevel graph.
Though the dominance relations can be defined in the decision problems with incomplete information about both weights and utilities (see [lo] ), in a special case where the value of utilities is known precisely, it is easy to establish the dominance relations.
The set of collecting dominance relations between the alternatives Q 2 A x A is defined so as to include the indifference relations as (%, aj) E R if and only if ai is at least as preferred as aj, where aj # aj. After 52 is identified, a hierarchical dominance graph GH(H(A), E) with H(A) = [HI,. . . , HL], where a set of arcs E C_ A x A is the set Q, Hk C_ A is a set of alternatives in the kth level, L the number of levels of G H, and Hk # 8 V k, is constructed as follows.
Construction
of a Hierarchical Dominance Graph Based on the Dominance Relation STEP 1. Construct the adjacent matrix M by using the information of 52. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE. Let us consider the following example, with three criteria, 01, 02, and 03, as shown in Table 1 . A multilevel graph based on the nested decomposition is shown in Figure 1 . In this figure, while dotted lines designate the "group dominance" by a reference set, solid lines simply represent the dominance by a single alternative.
On the other hand, a hierarchical domina.nce graph is constructed in this example. The set 0 is as follows: {ta~,a2),ta~,a6),(al,a7),(al,a8),tal,a9),(al,al2),tal,a14),tal,al5), Since s2 is transitive, R = (rij) = I + M where I is an n x n identity matrix. From the set R, a hierarchical dominance graph GH (H (A), E) is constructed as shown in Figure 2 . In this figure, arcs which are derived from transitivity are omitted and therefore, E C 0.
It is clear that (i) if ak dominates aj, then ak is placed in a higher level than aj in both graphs, (ii) ak is indifferent to aj, then ak and aj are placed in the same level in both graphs, and (iii) each ak in the multilevel graph is placed in the same or lower level than in the hierarchical domination graph since the former captures not only the dominance by an alternative but also the "group dominance" by the reference set.
For instance, neither alo nor ai3 dominates as. Therefore, aa is placed in the top level of the hierarchical dominance graph as shown in Figure 2 . Since aa is, however, dominated by Ei = {a1o,a13}, it cannot be the top of the ranking and is placed in the second level as shown in Figure 1 . And, a in the second level in Figure 2 is dominated by Ez = {al, aa} and is placed in the third level in Figure 1 . Similarly, a7, as, ag, as 6&e, respectively, placed in lower levels than those in Figure 2 .
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have presented a multilevel graph of alternatives to represent the incomplete ranking, to the extent that this is possible when incomplete information on the weights is available under the assumption of the additive value function. The nested decomposition of the set of alternatives is established by sequentially locating efficient frontiers using the DEA formulation.
A numerical example is given to illustrate a multilevel graph based on the nested decomposition and compare it with the hierarchical dominance graph based on dominance relations proposed by Park and Kim. It is shown that our procedure provides at least as much information regarding the ranking as does the hierarchical dominance graph based on dominance relations, since the former captures not only the dominance by an alternative but also the group dominance by the reference set.
